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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory 
appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is from the order of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Summit County denying 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. 
Defendants' Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was granted by 
this Court on March 7, 1990. The order to be reviewed is the 
Order dated December 28, 1989 and entered January 3, 1990. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended) applies to provide for 
the refiling of an action originally filed pursuant to, and in 
accordance with, the provisions of, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1, et 
seq., when the original Complaint was subsequently dismissed 
for a cause otherwise than upon the merits. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This interlocutory appeal presents no disputed facts 
for review by this Court. The issues presented involve 
questions of statutory interpretation which are questions of 
law. This Court is required to review the lower court's 
decision for correctness without according deference thereto. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
-iv-
STATUTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended): 
§ 78-12 iu. It any action is commenced 
within due time and a judgment thereon for 
the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a 
cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited either by law 
or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
ind the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new actJ m 
within one year after the reversal 01 
t a i 1 u i e , 
§ b7-1-32. At any time within three months 
after any sale of property undei a trust 
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may 
be commenced to recover the balance due upon 
the obligation for which the tiusf deed was 
given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount 
of the indebtedness which was secured by 
such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before 
rendering judgment , the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which 
the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any 
action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in hringinq an action under 
this section. 
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Counsel for defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint on April 5, 1988. The basis for the Motion to 
Dismiss was plaintiff's failure to "issue" two summonses within 
the period required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b), as 
it read at that time. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the 
lower court in an Order dated May 2, 1988. The Order provides 
that "Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint are dismissed 
without prejudice." (emphasis added). (R.7) 
Plaintiff refiled, seeking the same relief against 
defendants, on March 13, 1989. (R.l). One of the defendants, 
Rufe Soule, was served on or about July 18, 1989. (R.25). The 
second Complaint was filed within the one-year statutory period 
established by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. 
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's 
Complaint on September 18, 1989. (R.27). That motion was 
denied by the lower court in an Order entered on January 3, 
1990. (R.76). It is the lower court's denial of defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss which provides the basis for this 
interlocutory appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED. 
The original Complaint in this action was filed within 
the three month period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 
(1953, as amended). The original complaint was dismissed for a 
reason "otherwise than upon the merits." It was then properly 
-2-
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IV. DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH THE TRUST DEED STATUTE IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
In Point II of their Brief, defendants raise a new 
argument which is not found in the record, was not argued in 
the court below, and has not been certified for appeal. This 
Court cannot properly review matters which have never been 
raised in the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED. 
Plaintiff's action was filed within the statutory 
limits of Utah law. The trustee's sale of the subject property 
was conducted on March 11, 1987. The original Complaint in 
this action was filed on June 8, 1987, within the three month 
period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (the "trust deed 
statute"). The original complaint was dismissed, without 
prejudice, on May 2, 1988. The sole reason for dismissal was 
plaintiff's failure to issue summonses within the three month 
period required by Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
it read at that time. (R.7). The timely filing of the 
original Complaint was never at issue. 
The original Complaint was dismissed for a reason 
"otherwise than upon the merits" and falls squarely within the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended), 
(the "savings statute"). That statute provides: 
- 4 -
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or 
if he dies and the cause of action survives, 
his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or 
failure. (Emphasis added). 
The statute operates to extend the time within which any action 
may be filed where there has not been an adjudication upon the 
merits. 
There are three conditions for the application of the 
savings statute. First, an action must have been commenced. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a 
civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the 
court, . .H This Rule does not establish any other requirement 
for the "commencement" of an action. There is no dispute that 
plaintiff's first complaint was timely filed within three 
months of the trustee's sale. 
A second requirement for the application of the 
statute is that plaintiff's action fails "otherwise than on the 
merits." There was no trial of this case "upon the merits." 
The dismissal of the original Complaint was premised solely 
upon the application of the technical operation of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The dismissal was without 
prejudice. The second precondition to the application of the 
savings statute has been satisfied. 
Finally, a party seeking the benefit of the savings 
statute must refile its action within one year of the dismissal 
or other failure. Plaintiff's second deficiency action was 
filed on March 13, 1989, less than one year after the lower 
court's original order. This case is squarely within the 
provisions of the savings statute. 
POINT II 
THE TIME LIMITATION FOUND WITHIN THE UTAH TRUST DEED 
STATUTE MAY BE EXTENDED BY APPLICATION OF THE SAVINGS 
STATUTE. 
Defendants mistakenly contend that strict construction 
of the Utah trust deed statute prohibits application of the 
savings statute. Despite the defendant's elaborate and lengthy 
argument this contention lacks authority or analysis. 
Defendants' contention might have some merit if dismissal of 
the prior suit was rooted in the plaintiff's failure to comply 
with any provision of the trust deed statute. Significantly, 
the defendants cannot identify any failure by plaintiff to 
comply with the Utah trust deed statute. 
Plaintiff has fully complied with the strict 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1, e^c seg. In neither of 
their motions to dismiss below did the defendants identify a 
single deviation from the statutory guidelines. Their attempt 
now to allege a deviation for the first time before this Court 
is improper. The allegation raised in "Point II" of their 
brief, that plaintiff failed to allow a three month 
reinstatement period prior to filing its notice of sale, was 
not presented to the court below. Consequently, that 
contention has not been ruled upon upon or even addressed by 
the lower court. That issue, if indeed it exists, is not now 
properly before this Court and should be granted no 
consideration in this appeal. 
The sale of the subject property was valid and an 
action to collect upon the deficiency was commenced within the 
three month period. The action was dismissed without 
prejudice, not because of any failure to comply with the trust 
deed requirements, but because of a failure to timely issue the 
summonses. This is precisely the purpose for which the savings 
statute was enacted. 
A dismissal for a procedural failure is not a decision 
upon the merits. Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496, 76 P. 678 
(1930), Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 P. 39 (1914), 
Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 
(1923). The May 2, 1988 order itself provides that the action 
is dismissed "without prejudice." Contrary to defendants' 
analysis, the requirements of the trust deed statute are not 
altered, or in any way compromised, by the application of the 
savings statute. Each statute serves a specific and separate 
purpose, yet neither exists in a vacuum. If the Court were to 
accept defendants' analysis, the savings statute would have no 
application in matters involving the trust deed statute. 
The three month period provided by the trust deed 
statute for commencing actions to recover deficiencies would, 
in the majority of cases, provide insufficient time to refile 
an action after dismissal for any reason, regardless of whether 
the requirements of the trust deed statute were originally met 
or not. In other words, applying defendants' analysis, 
subsequent refiling of deficiency actions, dismissed for any 
procedural failure not related to the requirements of the 
deficiency statute, are barred. Had the legislature intended 
that result, it certainly could have so provided in the text of 
the statute. 
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 
(Utah 1980), the Court reviewed two separate statutes which had 
provided the basis for dismissal of that action in the lower 
court. One of those statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8, 
provides in pertinent part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be initiated unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. 
The plaintiff in Yates had neglected to provide the ninety 
days' notice as required by the malpractice Act. Failure to 
comply with that provision was one basis for dismissal. This 
Court held that § 78-12-40 applied to allow plaintiff one year 
from the dismissal date to refile the Complaint. 
The dismissal of plaintiffs action against the 
governmental entity was, on the other hand, upheld. The 
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the Vernal 
Family Health Center, a governmental entity, was based upon 
plaintiff's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 
which provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the cause 
of action arises. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court held that § 63-10-13 was dispositive and upheld the 
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against the 
Health Center on that basis. The Court placed emphasis on the 
fact that the statute expressly provided that claims not 
complying therewith are "barred." The language of the statute 
itself allowed for no other interpretation. The intent of the 
Legislature was clear. No similar intent is expressed in the 
trust deed statute. 
As defendants point out in their Brief, the savings 
statute was in existence long before the trust deed statute was 
enacted. In enacting the trust deed statute, and determining 
the effect of the provisions contained therein, the legislature 
could have provided that actions not commenced within three 
months of a trustee's sale are barred. It did not do so or in 
any other way indicate or infer that § 78-12-40 should not be 
applied to allow the refiling of a deficiency action in the 
event of a dismissal of that action not on the merits. 
The contention that the trust deed statute impliedly 
amended the savings statute is completely without merit. There 
is no basis in the legislative history of the trust deed 
statute, or in subsequent judicial interpretations of that 
statute which would suggest an abrogation of § 78-12-40. 
Section 78-12-40 applies to "any action" commenced under Utah 
law. 
Section 78-12-40 is clear and unambiguous and states 
plainly that it applies to any action commenced within due time 
which fails otherwise than upon the merits. The words "any 
action," without limitation or qualification, mean "any 
action." They do not mean "any action not based upon statute." 
The defendants acknowledge, "Where a statute is clear upon its 
face and is susceptible of but one construction, that 
construction must be given to it." Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 
U.S. 414, 421, 20 S.Ct. 155, 44 L.Ed. 219 (1899). 
Defendants argue that the savings statute applies 
solely to causes of action recognized at common law. Utah 
courts have consistently refused to adopt the defendants' 
restrictive interpretation. Limitation periods have been 
extended, through the invocation of the savings statute, in the 
application of Utah's Wrongful Death statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-12 (1953, as amended), Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 
(Utah 1980); the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. (1953, as amended), Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); and the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et: seq. (1953, as amended), 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
In its most recent decision on the subject, Madsen v. 
Borthick, supra, this Court determined that the Utah savings 
statute extended a cause of action brought pursuant to Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Court held: 
One purpose of section 78-12-40 is to assure 
that claimants are not deprived of 
potentially valid suits by appeals that are 
not resolved until after the applicable 
periods of limitations run. In accordance 
with that purpose, we have held that if 
dismissal of the first action is appealed, 
section 78-12-40's extension of time for 
filing a second action runs from the date of 
the dismissal's affirmance. 
Other Utah cases have applied the savings statute to 
"statutory" causes of action. In Foil v. Ballinger, supra, a 
plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act (the "Malpractice Act"). The plaintiff's 
complaint was dismissed because of her failure to serve a 
notice of intent to sue as required by § 78-14-4. She later 
complied with the provisions of the Malpractice Act, but her 
second complaint was filed outside the Malpractice Act's 
statute of limitation. 
The Court noted that as the first "suit was dismissed 
without prejudice, the dismissal was not an adjudication on the 
merits," As such, the savings statute was applicable. 
"Plaintiff therefore had the right to refile the action within 
one year if the first action had been properly "commenced" as 
that term is used in § 78-12-40." Id. at 149. This is the 
same result as that reached in Yates v. Vernal Family Health 
Center, supra. 
Significantly, defendants cite no Utah authority for 
their proposition that the savings statute merely applies to 
common law causes of action. There is no rationale for this 
separation and, in modern jurisprudence, it is an artificial 
distinction. The codification of the statutes of limitation 
themselves undermines defendants' theory—the general statutes 
of limitations themselves incorporate "statutory" claims. See, 
e.g., § 78-12-26(4), Utah Code Ann. Contrary, therefore, to 
defendants' argument that the inclusion of the savings statute 
in Chapter 12 of Title 78 indicates that it was intended to 
apply only to common law causes of action, the savings statute 
applies to causes of action created by statute as well. 
The artificial character of defendants' distinction 
between statutory and common law causes of action is 
underscored by their own analysis. While defendants proclaim 
that this distinction is dispositive on page 20 of their brief; 
by page 23, they admit that the distinction is only valid where 
the statute does not contain an internal limitations period. 
This Jesuitical attempt at definition is neither supported by 
statute nor logic. 
The only authority defendants can muster in support of 
their theory is AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). In Raintree, however, no 
suit was commenced within the statutory period. Plaintiffs in 
the instant case commenced their suit in a timely fashion, a 
fact which defendants acknowledge. Raintree, therefore, is not 
applicable. The savings statute applies to all causes of 
action unless its application is specifically excluded by 
statute or unless a statute provides that a cause of action is 
"barred" by failure to comply with a particular limitation 
period or notice provision. 
POINT III 
APPLICATION OF THE SAVINGS STATUTE TO THE TRUST DEED 
STATUTE IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS APPLICATION TO ALL 
OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION 
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed within the 
three month period prescribed by the trust deed statute. The 
filing of that Complaint put defendants on notice that 
plaintiff intended to recover from defendants the deficiency 
remaining after the trustee's sale. Defendants then made the 
tactical decision to avoid the determination of plaintiff's 
claims on the merits by moving for dismissal on the basis that 
plaintiff had made a procedural error in the issuance of the 
summonses. Plaintiff committed a procedural error and 
defendants' motion was successful. Plaintiff's Complaint was 
dismissed. 
At the time defendants sought and obtained dismissal 
of plaintiff's Complaint, the savings statute was in effect. 
It was not something conjured up by plaintiff at a later date 
in an attempt to deny defendants any protection afforded by 
law. It was, in fact, and remains, a venerable statute upon 
which plaintiff was entitled to rely in refiling its action 
against defendants. Plaintiff's renewed action seeks nothing 
more or less than did its original Complaint. In actuality, 
defendants have already enjoyed the benefit of the trust deed 
statute's three month filing provision and remain protected by 
the statute's other provisions, including the fair market value 
restriction on recovery of the deficiency. 
Defendants would persuade this Court that application 
of the one year savings period to a three month statute of 
limitation renders an absurd result. Their conclusion is not 
supported by law or logic. In fact, the law in Utah supports 
the application of the savings statute to shorter periods. In 
Foil v. Ballinger, supra., the Court held that the savings 
statute allowed the plaintiff to refile her action which had 
been dismissed for her failure to comply with the Health Care 
Malpractice Act's ninety day notice requirement. 
Regardless of the limitation period applicable to any 
given cause of action, the result of applying the savings 
statute is the same. Defendants in each case are required to 
defend an action which, without application of the statute, 
would be barred. Certainly, that result is not welcomed by any 
defendant, whether that defendant initially benefitted from a 
three month or a six year limitation period. A defendant's 
reluctance to defend a cause of action on the merits, however, 
has never been grounds to deny application of the savings 
statute. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF'S FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH THE TRUST DEED STATUTE IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
In Point II of their brief, defendants raise a 
completely new argument, not found in the record or argued 
before the court below. This matter is before this court upon 
an interlocutory appeal from the lower court on the sole issue 
of the application of the savings statute to the proceedings 
herein. No evidence or law was presented to the trial court 
judge and this ruling did not address defendants' argument. 
The Supreme Court does not review matters which have never been 
raised in the lower court. Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947). 
Further, defendants* second contention was not 
certified for appeal. The Certification for Appeal dated 
December 19, 1989 (R. 91-92) makes no mention of this issue. 
Defendants' Petition for Permission to Appeal dated January 11, 
1990 (R. 80-83) also omits any mention of this issue. Despite 
an exhaustive discussion of their first point, defendants make 
no mention of the second issue. This court should not sanction 
appeal by ambush. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's original Complaint was timely filed and 
complied with all of the provisions of the trust deed statute. 
Plaintiff's original Complaint failed otherwise than upon the 
merits. The savings statute operates to extend the time within 
which any action which has failed otherwise than on the merits 
may be filed. Application of the savings statute to the trust 
deed statute is consistent with its application to every other 
cause of action, whether based upon statute or founded in 
common law. Application of the savings statute to the trust 
deed statute is also consistent with this Court's prior rulings 
applying the savings statute to causes of action created by 
statute. The savings statute was in effect when the 
legislature enacted the trust deed statute and the legislature 
was not, arguably, unmindful of its existence. Nor, arguably, 
were defendants unmindful of its existence when they obtained 
dismissal of plaintiff's original Complaint. They had no 
reason to believe, therefor, that plaintiff would not refile 
its action pursuant to the provisions of the savings statute. 
For these reasons, and those discussed above, this Court should 
uphold the clear meaning of the savings statute by holding that 
it does apply to the trust deed statute and remand this matter 
to the District Court for trial on the merits. 
DATED this 2 5 ^ ^ day of July, 1990. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By t/<n\ ft y^J^criAT 
Don R. Schow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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